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CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER DILEMMA
Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson

C

hina’s national leadership is facing a dilemma that has bedeviled many
other powers in modern history. The challenge—an especially difficult one
in an era of rapid technological change—is discerning when and how to spend
finite military budgets on new technology, organization, doctrine, and force
structure. The history of navies trying to anticipate and prepare for the next war
is replete with both positive and negative analogies to which Beijing can turn.
These include Germany’s attempts prior to World Wars I and II to strike the right
balance between fleet-on-fleet and guerre de course and missing on both counts;
Japan’s pattern prior to World War II of innovating with aircraft carriers and
amphibious warfare but keeping the battleship firmly at the center of its naval
doctrine; and even China’s own naval embarrassments in the 1884–85
Sino-French War and the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, in which poor standardization, divided political and military leadership, and slow mobilization cost the
Qing dynasty two very expensive fleets.
The numerous sources available suggest that these issues weigh heavily on
China’s naval strategists today. Getting the answers right in the near term will
appropriately shape China’s force structure and inform training and doctrine in
anticipation of the most likely scenarios. Obviously, analyses regarding the nature of the next war, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the possible
belligerents, and the characteristics of the likely theater will determine those answers. In other words, strategic focus and concentration on the nature of the
next war can spur modernization. Taiwan scenarios certainly dominate Beijing’s
attention, but while they narrow the decision sets, they do not resolve the central
dilemma facing China’s maritime strategists.
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Of the issues that confront Chinese naval modernization, the most comprehensive and far-reaching is the extent to which Beijing has faced a choice between a navy focused on large-deck aviation and one based fundamentally on
submarines. The answer is the simplest possible—not at all. China has yet to
confront the issue in any meaningful way, and that is so because its technology,
assets, and facilities are far from a state that might force the issue.
Whether it makes sense now for China actually to develop an aircraft carrier
1
has apparently been the subject of considerable debate in China. Hong Kong’s
Phoenix Television has quoted Song Xiaojun, editor in chief of Jianchuan Zhishi
(Naval & Merchant Ships), as stating that a PLA faction advocates aircraft carrier
development but must compete with elements urging submarine and aerospace
2
industry development. One Chinese analyst states that Beijing, reflecting the
interests of the submarine faction, is currently focused on developing new types
of submarines in part precisely because they can attack carrier strike groups
(CSGs), presumably those of the United States. Carriers present large targets and
have weaker defenses than (and cannot easily detect) submarines. Submarines
can attack CSGs with “torpedoes, sea mines, and missiles,” thereby rendering sea
lines of communications and seaborne trade itself vulnerable to undersea at3
tack. The analyst contends that China’s Type 093 and 094 submarines will increase the sea-denial capabilities, strategic depth, coastal defense, and
4
long-range attack capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In a
recent meeting with the authors, a senior Chinese official elaborated that although he had “been an advocate of aircraft carriers for many years because we
need them,” until recently carriers had “not been the best use of national resources” because China “lacks an escort fleet,” thereby making any carrier a vulnerable target. China has therefore invested instead in “submarines, mid-sized
5
ships, and fighters [aircraft].”
At the same time, however, dismissing China’s carrier aspirations could be
myopic, given its rapid development of all other major aspects of its navy over
the past few years. Submarines currently dominate China’s naval development,
but they might not do so indefinitely. Contending that submarine force development is not a panacea for the PLAN, one Chinese analyst calls for “rethinking the
theory that aircraft carriers are useless and [that one should] rely solely on assassin’s maces,” or asymmetric silver bullet–type weapons: “Allied ASW is very
strong. . . . [T]he U.S. and Japan carefully monitor PLAN submarine activities. . . .
PLAN submarines’ 533 mm torpedoes are insufficient to constitute a strong
threat to a U.S. aircraft carrier [and] PLAN submarine-carried guided missiles
6
are insufficient to wound an aircraft carrier.”
The aforementioned Chinese official stated to the authors in 2006 that
“China will have its own aircraft carrier” in “twelve to fifteen years.” In 2004,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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however, he had declared to a group of Western academics that there was an internal political and military consensus that China had no intention of developing an aircraft carrier. When asked to explain this apparent contradiction, the
official stated that over the past two years the subject of aircraft carrier development has become a “heated internal debate” in Beijing as Chinese national interests have grown, sea lines of communication have become ever more important,
the need to rescue Chinese citizens overseas has become increasingly apparent,
and “air coverage” is viewed as an essential component of “balanced naval
7
forces.”
China has made great progress in
many dimensions necessary to support the development of aircraft carriers, though in some areas it is
unclear whether substantial efforts
have been made at all. The PLAN’s
submarine program is far ahead of
its carrier (CV) program. In India, by
contrast, the CV program is far
ahead of the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) program; Spain, Japan, and Thailand have carriers
though they lack SSBNs entirely,
Pierside view of ex-Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev at Binhai Aircraft Carrier museum in Tianjin,
whereas the United Kingdom and
China.
France deploy both carriers and
SSBNs. The Chinese literature notes all of these potential force structure models
and the disparities in capabilities and experience between not merely the PLAN
and the world’s leading navies, but most notably between the PLAN and its regional peers, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Indian
navy. In that literature the discussion of submarines, both as machines and as
operational and strategic platforms, is much more advanced and grounded in
reality than that of carriers—which is still notional, if not romantic, and largely
8
comprises rather generic analyses of possible ship-configuration options. Certainly, there is logic, reinforced by the German and Japanese examples, in not
playing to the adversary’s strength. If the greater payoff is to be found in an
asymmetric “silver bullet” or “assassin’s mace” that SS/SSNs or mine warfare
seem to offer, why should Beijing invest in a war-fighting specialty—that is,
power-projection carrier operations—in which the PLAN is so clearly outmatched by the U.S. Navy and that appears ill suited to China’s overall defensive
9
posture?
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This, however, does not mean that the way ahead for the Chinese navy—
which currently has a submarine-centered force structure and doctrine—is cast
in stone or that the choice need be mutually exclusive. In fact, while submarines
seem to be ascendant, the Chinese are still actively engaged with the carrier
question and are reframing the terms of the debate. That debate, moreover, has
been reinvigorated by recent events, notably the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami,
which the above-cited Chinese official averred had “definitely” changed Chinese
thinking about the utility of aircraft carriers, and by the advent of China’s eleventh “five-year plan,” for the period 2006–10. This paper examines China’s progress thus far, the road ahead, and a range of ways in which an aircraft carrier
might ultimately fit into the PLAN’s emerging order of battle.
CHINA’S CARRIER DEVELOPMENT HISTORY AND
FUTURE OPTIONS
The aircraft carrier has long had determined, if not numerous, advocates at the
highest levels of the Chinese military. Adm. Liu Huaqing, a student of Soviet admiral Sergei Gorshkov at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad (1954–58),
championed the aircraft carrier when he became chief of the PLAN (1982–88) and
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989–97). “Building aircraft carriers has all along been a matter of concern for the Chinese people,” Admiral Liu insisted. “To modernize our national defense and build a perfect
weaponry and equipment system, we cannot but consider the development of
aircraft carriers.”10
Liu has been credited with an instrumental role in modernizing China’s navy
and with conceiving ambitious goals for its future power projection, in the
11
framework of “island chains.” Liu and others have defined the First Island
Chain, or current limit of most PLAN operations, as comprising Japan and its
northern and southern archipelagos (the latter disputed by China), South Korea,
12
Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Second Island Chain, which Liu envisioned as
being fully within the scope of future PLAN activities, ranges from the Japanese
13
archipelago south to the Bonin and Marshall islands, including Guam. Some
unofficial Chinese publications refer to a “Third Island Chain” centered on
14
America’s Hawaiian bases, viewed as a “strategic rear area” for the U.S. military.
The ultimate goal is a Chinese navy that can perform a mix of sea denial, area denial, and varying degrees of power projection within and out to these island
chains.
In his 2004 autobiography, coverage of which by China’s Xinhua press agency
implies quasi-official endorsement, Admiral Liu described in some detail his as15
sociation with, and aspirations for, efforts to develop an aircraft carrier. As
early as 1970, Liu “organized a special feasibility study for building aircraft
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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carriers as instructed by the higher authorities and submitted a project proposal
16
to them.” In May 1980, Liu became the first PLA leader to tour an American
aircraft carrier, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63). This experience left him “deeply im17
pressed by its imposing magnificence and modern fighting capacity.” Liu
stated that he emphasized to the PLA General Staff the need to devote great effort to “two large . . . key issues” essential not only to “long range combat operations” in “wartime but also to deterrence power in peacetime”: development of
18
aircraft carriers and of SSBNs.
Liu recalled that the question of Chinese aircraft development had weighed
particularly heavily on him when he became PLAN commander in 1982. “With
the development of maritime undertakings and the change in the mode of sea
struggles, the threats from sea we were facing differed vastly from the past,” Liu
assessed. “We had to deal with SSBNs and ship-based air forces, both capable of
long-range attacks. To meet that requirement, the strength of the Chinese Navy
seemed somewhat inadequate. Despite our long coastal defense line, we had only
small and medium-sized warships and land-based air units, which were merely
capable of short-distance operations. In case of a sea war, all we could do was to
deplore our weakness.” But “by developing air carriers,” Liu believed, “we could
solve this problem successfully.”
In early 1984, at the First Naval Armament and Technology Work Conference, Liu recalled stating, “Quite some time has elapsed since the Navy had the
idea of building aircraft carriers. Now, our national strength is insufficient for us
to do this. It seems that we have to wait for some time.” In 1986, however, “when
briefed by leaders of the Navy Armament and Technology Department,” Liu revisited the issue. “I said that we had to build aircraft carriers,” Liu recalled, and
that “we must consider this question by 2000. At this stage . . . we need not discuss the model of carriers to be built, but should make some preliminary studies.” The Gorshkov-educated Liu saw a historical analogue: “The Soviet Union
spent 30 years developing carriers. At the beginning, there were different opinions about building carriers. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party did not have a firm determination to do this, but the Soviet people wanted
carriers. Shortly afterward, they started building carriers. Judging from our
present situation, even for defense purposes only, we are in need of carriers.” Following Liu’s entreaty, “the leaders of the Navy Armament and Technology Department promptly passed my idea to the Naval Armament Feasibility Study
Center. Then, the two departments teamed up to organize a feasibility study in
19
this respect.”
Liu suggested that in 1987 China was finally on track to address the “key
20
question” of the carrier platform and its aircraft. On 31 March of that year, he
reported to the PLA General Staff that Chinese aviation and shipbuilding
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/4
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industry leaders and experts assessed that their country was “technologically capable of building carriers and ship-borne aircraft.” Liu allowed that “with regard
to some special installations, of course, there are questions that we must deal
with seriously. But they can be solved.” Liu suggested that China begin carrier
development “feasibility studies in the Seventh Five-Year Plan period, do research and conduct preliminary studies of the platform deck and key questions
on the aircraft during the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, and decide on the types
and models in 2000.”
Liu contended that “the annual spending for the present and the following
years will not be too much” and that “technologically [the plan had] many advantages.” These included catalyzing “the development of technologies required
by the state and by national defense.” Moreover, “through the preliminary studies, we can get a deeper understanding of the value of aircraft carriers and the
need for their existence in war preparations. This understanding will be conducive to making a final scientific policy decision.” Liu maintained that his “report
had a certain effect on the PLA General Staff Department and the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense [COSTIND]. After
that, the science research units concerned and the Navy’s armament department
started to make relatively in-depth feasibility studies for developing aircraft carriers under the auspices of [COSTIND].”
Throughout his vigorous promotion of aircraft carriers, Liu insisted, he
weighed overall naval and national interests carefully. “During the feasibility studies . . . I stressed the need to make a combat cost comparison between using aircraft
carriers and ship-borne aircraft and using land-based air divisions, aerial
refuellers, and land-based aircraft,” he continued. “Later, when I was working with
the Central Military Commission, I continued to pay attention to this matter. I
asked [COSTIND] and the Armament Department of the PLA General Staff Department to make an overall funding plan for developing carriers, including the
funds needed for preliminary studies, research, and armament.” Liu stated that the
aforementioned plan “should be listed along with the plans for developing warships, aircraft, weapons, and electronic equipment rather than included in the aircraft carrier development program so as to avoid creating an excessively large
project that the higher authorities could not readily study. I told them clearly that
21
any plan they made should be discussed by the Central Military Commission.”
As for foreign technology, Liu reports,
I gave approval for experts of the Navy and related industries to visit such countries
as France, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine to inspect aircraft carriers. During
that period, departments related to the national defense industry invited Russian carrier design experts to China to give lectures. Technical materials on carrier designs
were introduced into our country, and progress was made in preliminary studies
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concerning key accessories aboard carriers. Under arrangements made by the PLA
General Staff Department and [COSTIND], findings obtained from the inspection
trips, materials introduced from abroad, and the results of our own preliminary
studies were analyzed, studied, and appraised. This enabled many leaders and experts
within and outside the military to enhance their understanding of the large systems
engineering [required] for [developing] carriers and ship-borne aircraft.22

In his retirement Liu was to recall that he had “fulfilled [his] responsibility for
23
making some plans for developing an aircraft carrier for China.” In 2005, retired vice admiral Zhang Xusan stated, “I certainly advocate having an aircraft
carrier soon. . . . When I was [deputy commander of the PLA] Navy I advocated
that, and at that time Commander . . . Liu Huaqing advocated it too, but for
many reasons it was postponed. I believe that it will not be too long before we will
have an aircraft carrier. When, what year, I can’t say, because I’m not in charge of
24
that matter now. But I feel we will have one in the not too distant future.”
It remains unclear to what extent Liu’s advocacy of carriers, which he termed
the “core of the Navy’s combined battle operations” and considered a symbol of
overall national strength that many other countries had already developed, has
25
actually influenced PLAN development. As Liu himself was careful to emphasize, “the development of an aircraft carrier is not only a naval question, it is also
a major question of national strategy and defense policy. It must emerge from
the exact position [of] and prudent strategy [concerning] comprehensive na26
tional strength and overall national maritime strategy.” In light, however, of
both Beijing’s determination to be respected universally as a great power and its
growing maritime interests, the Chinese navy has clearly been contemplating
various alternatives for developing aircraft carriers—research that provides critical indicators of Beijing’s emerging maritime strategy.
Overseas New Construction
When it comes to obtaining a working carrier, China has several options, but
each largely limits what the carrier could be used for. Buying a big-deck, Western
strike platform akin to the Enterprise or Nimitz has apparently never been seriously considered. It would simply not be within the realm of the possible to acquire such a ship from the West—including, apparently, even Russia, which
27
China reportedly approached in the early 1990s. Moreover, operating a
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier or equivalent is among the most complex tasks of
modern warfare. Matching American or French expertise at large-deck power
projection would involve incredible cost and many years of trial and error.
China may be weighing the costs and benefits of vertical-and-short-takeoffand-landing (VSTOL) and catapult aircraft carriers, the latter of which could
support larger aircraft with greater payloads. Specialists at China’s Naval Engineering University and Naval Aeronautical Institute have conducted research on
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/4
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steam-powered catapults, but it appears to be theoretical in nature. Only a few
navies, notably those of the United States and France, have solved the perplexing
mechanics and daunting upkeep of steam catapults or the subtleties of arresting
gear, and they are unlikely to sell them to foreign powers. When it comes to aircraft for a conventional deck, only the United States and France have thirdgeneration catapult-capable planes (we will return to aircraft below).
Another option for overseas purchase would be a small-to-midsized
VSTOL-capable carrier from a European producer, such as Spain’s Navantia, the
29
builders of Thailand’s ten-thousand-ton Chakri Naruebet. In fact, there were
some tentative moves in this direction in the mid-1990s, but nothing developed
from them. Empresa Nacional Bazán, which merged with Astilleros Españoles
S.A. (AESA) to form Navantia in 2000, reportedly attempted to market its
SAC-200 and -220 light conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) designs to
China in 1995–96, but apparently Beijing was interested in obtaining design
30
plans, as opposed to a prebuilt carrier. Given the continuation of the
post-Tiananmen U.S.-European arms embargo on the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), the acquisition of operational carriers from overseas seems highly
unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding all of this, however, buying a carrier undeniably saves time,
trouble, and expense, by capitalizing on the expertise of others and securing a
proven commodity, and it is notable how the Chinese debate has accommodated
to this reality.
Indigenous New Construction
This approach would appear to offer a wider range of options and would allow
the Chinese to take engineering and architectural clues from other navies and
tailor the ship more closely to China’s anticipated naval doctrine and aspirations. Nonetheless, start-up costs are very high, and the “delta” between plans
and construction is large. China would confront such challenges as a long timetable and a lack of relevant experience. Prestige issues would seem to push China
toward the biggest ship possible, but lately there have been signs of favoring a
more modest ten-to-twenty-five-thousand-ton ship that would carry helicopters or VSTOL aircraft, like the British Harrier or newer versions of Russia’s
Yak-141. These discussions include some speculation that such a ship might
even be nuclear powered, although conventional power seems more realistic.
This proposal has drawn intense interest within China’s navy and in the opinion
of the authors is the most realistic course of action if the PLAN is to bring aircraftcarrying naval vessels into service in the near future.
However, according to sources of varying credibility, a more ambitious construction plan, sometimes referred to as “Project 9935,” is under way that would produce
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a large-deck, conventionally powered CTOL carrier in the fifty-thousand-ton
range capable of launching and retrieving carrier-capable versions of Russian
Su-30 aircraft, possibly within the next few years. While these aspirations are not
to be lightly dismissed, Chinese-language sources reflect little attention to this
program, far less than to smaller helicopter and VSTOL-carrying ships. If a vessel along the lines of the 9935 concept were to come down the ways in a Chinese
shipyard, it would be likely to do so under the twelfth five-year plan, which will
begin in 2011. In the near term, it is critical to monitor the purchase or production of support ships, aircraft, and shipboard systems that would be required to
support an operational carrier strike group regardless of whether the notional
9935 carrier or some other vessel is to constitute its core.
Rebuilding
China has already purchased four decommissioned aircraft carriers, to considerable Western media speculation. In 1985, China purchased for scrap the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne, from which it may have learned engineering
principles—albeit limited and perhaps antiquated ones—when dismantling it.
The ex-Russian Minsk, acquired by front companies in 1998, is now the center31
piece of a Chinese “military education” amusement park in Shenzhen. A ship
32
of the same class, Kiev, arrived in Tianjin in 2000; it was subsequently renovated to attract tourists as the center of “China’s largest national defense educa33
tion base” and “the world’s largest military theme park.” A visit to Kiev in June
2006 revealed a replica of a PRC J-10 aircraft, of which China may be developing
a carrier-compatible version, below deck. The vessel itself, however, appeared to
receive only cosmetic maintenance and is therefore likely in no condition to go
34
to sea. Finally, the Russian “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” Admiral
Kuznetzov–class Varyag (purchased from Ukraine in 1998 for twenty million
dollars and delivered in 2002) has attracted renewed international attention after having recently received a fresh coat of PLAN silver-gray paint, and possibly
35
other renovations, at Dalian Shipyard. The subject of much press speculation,
Varyag is the most likely candidate if a decommissioned carrier is to be made operational. At the very least, its expensive acquisition and lengthy refurbishing
seem to contradict the stated intention of its original buyer, Macao’s Agencia
Turisticae Diversoes Chong Lot Limitada, to use it as a floating casino. There
have even been claims that by 2008 Varyag will be operational and based in
Yalong Bay, Sanya City, on Hainan Island, to protect the Spratlys and the Taiwan
36
Strait. A senior Chinese official has told the authors that “some naval officers
37
want” to refit Varyag and that “there is still a heated debate.” The significance of
this insight is that operationalizing Varyag is not a dead letter in senior naval circles and that debate over its general utility and possible future roles continues.
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Many of Varyag’s apparent disadvantages as a first carrier for China can be
viewed in fact as advantages. Varyag was delivered without weapons, electronics
suites, or propulsion, so though start-up costs would be high, the potential for
customization is considerable. Further in its favor, Varyag is a very large ship, designed to displace 67,500 tons fully loaded; it can therefore be equipped with a
variety of aircraft and shipboard systems. It is also a known quantity, in that the
Soviets experimented with similar carriers and thought through related doctrinal issues. Finally, “off the shelf ” aircraft, including helicopters, CTOL, and
VSTOL, already exist that are known to work with the design and have been deployed aboard the Varyag’s sister ship, Admiral Kuznetzov.
On the downside, and though the Chinese can build a conventional power
plant as well as a shaft and screws sufficient to propel the Varyag, it seems unlikely that the reverse engineering this effort would entail could be easy or fast.
In addition, a large conventionally powered carrier could not operate far from
Chinese home waters without a combination of friendly foreign ports (to which
access is presently uncertain) or a robust underway-replenishment capability.
On this latter point, the PLAN regularly performs resupply and even repairs at
sea and could obviously learn from the practice of navies that now deploy conventional carriers. The Chinese, no doubt, are closely watching Indian efforts at
purchasing and eventually operationalizing the former Soviet Kiev-class VSTOL
carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Since India has operated ex-British carriers for years,
it already has a great deal of carrier experience, however, so China will inevitably
start far behind India’s level of expertise in actual carrier aviation and operation.
China’s old carriers, especially Minsk and Kiev, were probably purchased as “cadavers” to be dissected to inform indigenous design. Varyag—while it will certainly serve that purpose, especially as it reflects the largest and most advanced
Soviet carrier design—may ultimately also be used for pilot and deck crew training, as well as a “test platform” for general research and the development of cata38
pults, arresting gear, and other ship-board systems. To this end, Varyag may be
retrofitted with a power plant, shafts, and screws so that it can go to sea under its
own power, but training and equipment experimentation will likely be the extent
of its capabilities in the near term. Further out, a modestly capable Varyag may become a centerpiece of Beijing’s naval diplomacy by showing the flag and, in addition to training (following the model of the Shichang, discussed below), could
potentially be used for humanitarian operations and disaster relief. But as with
everything concerning Varyag, these projections are highly speculative.
COMMERCIAL CONVERSION
A final option would be to reconfigure a large commercial vessel as an aircraft carrier. A possible indication of austerity, flexibility, and commercial orientation is
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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apparent Chinese interest in Australian shipbuilding corporation INCAT’s “Evolution One12.” This wave-piercing catamaran is claimed to be “the world’s largest
diesel powered fast craft,” a distinction corroborated by INCAT. INCAT has reportedly proposed a “multifunction” VSTOL and helicopter ship for the Royal
39
Australian Navy. Were it to pursue a parallel course of development, China could
exploit its large and rapidly advancing shipbuilding sector, projected to become
40
soon the world’s largest. China’s shipbuilding industry appears to combine economic dynamism and broad-based Western technology assimilation with close
41
military coordination. Indeed, Shanghai’s Jiangnan shipyard—China’s largest
and perhaps soon the world’s largest—already contains both commercial facilities
and others for advanced submarines and surface warships.
Indeed, while commercial technology is not directly applicable to military
vessels—substantial modifications are necessary—China might prove more adept
at this process than many other nations. It is conceivable that carrier-relevant
research, development, and even production could proceed at one or more of
China’s major shipyards on a scale and with a rapidity that might surprise Western analysts. Certainly, however, there would be extraordinary challenges in
converting a merchant ship into a combat-ready carrier. Producing a ship capable of ferrying helicopters would be comparatively straightforward, but even
then the final result would likely be of minimal tactical utility and a tempting
target for an adversary. Ultimately the aircraft carrier itself is simply a platform
for air operations—the system of systems that allows for the projection of air
power from the sea. The acquisition of a Chinese carrier vessel is simply one step,
and a relatively simple one at that, along a complex continuum that may someday lead to a truly operational Chinese aircraft carrier. The subsequent steps involve hardware, software, and training.
The Carrier Hardware Package
All of these options would rely on conventional propulsion. While a theoretical
possibility, nuclear propulsion makes little sense for the Chinese, who do not
currently need surface combatants with the range of U.S. nuclear-powered carriers. Conventional propulsion is technologically much simpler and significantly more economical. Still, a carrier that can go to sea under its own power is
one thing; a fully operational carrier is another matter entirely. As we have seen,
there are many other technological and doctrinal questions to be answered.
Carrier operation demands a full complement of such elements as aircraft,
deck elevators, radars, and defenses. Already, Chinese specialists have conducted
extensive research in many major relevant areas. Experts at Beijing University of
42
Aeronautics and Astronautics have studied carrier-aircraft landing gear. Harbin
Engineering University’s Naval Architecture Department has examined the
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structural demands of flight decks. Other experts have analyzed “ski-jump” configurations (similar to those of Kuznetzov and some European VSTOL carriers)*
and other takeoff issues, deck-motion compensation, wake turbulence, wave-off
procedures, and landing decision aids, as well as aircraft-critical technologies
44
and command and control. In addition to detailed analyses of the requirements of current carrier operations, there is discussion of potentially revolutionary technologies that could be employed on next-generation carriers,
including electromagnetic catapults and “integrated full electric propulsion”
45
(IFEP). Nearly all of this research appears to be theoretical in nature, however,
and none of it proves that China has made actual progress in developing its own
aircraft carrier—or even has made an official decision to do so. Rather, it seems
to indicate that Chinese experts have followed closely major foreign aircraft carriers and are gaining increasing understanding of the systems and technologies
that their navies employ. Moreover, much of the research is at least indirectly ap46
plicable to targeting enemy carriers more effectively. In June 2006, a second
Chinese official informed the authors that in PLA internal meetings, Taiwan scenarios and how to target U.S. carrier strike groups are often discussed.
With respect to carrier aircraft, pilot training would be particularly problematic for VSTOL and VTOL aircraft, given China’s lack of relevant experience, if
less so for helicopters, though rotary-wing operations are now very modest in
the PLAN. In general, however, there has been incremental progress in Chinese
naval aviation, albeit from a rather low baseline. The PLA Naval Air Force
(PLANAF) is increasingly aggressive and confident in its basic homeland defense and interdiction missions, and its experience in nighttime over-water
training and patrol is growing. Leading indicators of serious aircraft-carrier preparations include the development of special air control radars and reinforced
landing gear. According to a 2004 article, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation has been working on a carrier variant of the J-10 but still faces many tech47
nological shortfalls. Another recent source claims that China may be seeking
Russian thrust-vectoring-controlled AL-31FN engines to render the J-10 better
48
capable of takeoff from a ski-jump deck and to reduce its landing speed. However, additional large purchases or licensing agreements for naval variants of
Russian aircraft suitable for carrier operations—such as the Yak-141, the
Su-30MKK, or the Su-33 (the last an Su-27 variant designed for Kuznetzov-class
carriers, and hence appropriate for Varyag)—would be one of the better indicators of where China’s aircraft carrier program is moving.49
* A ramp, typically twelve degrees, at the bow, that helps impart lift and permits heavier aircraft to
become airborne after a short takeoff run. This allows for greater range and weapon payload than
nonramped vertical/short take-offs, but still not on a par with the range and payloads of aircraft
launched by steam catapult.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp
Tuesday, October 10, 2006 11:12:40 AM

13

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 4

ERICKSON & WILSON

25

Obtaining aircraft would not in itself, however, mitigate the lack of practical
experience with them in a carrier environment. Great leaps forward in operational capabilities solely through acquisition are unlikely. More incremental improvements—akin to Japan’s gradual approach to its helicopter-carrying
Osumi-class, and next-generation, LSTs (which some speculate may deploy
fixed-wing aircraft, possibly the Joint Strike Fighter)—are more realistic. In this
regard, Thailand’s acquisition of the Spanish-built Chakri Naruebet may serve as
a tangible lesson. Bangkok acquired this fully outfitted, very expensive ship in
1997 but due to financial constraints and lack of experience has rarely deployed it.
Therefore, there are many reasons for the Chinese to pace themselves rather than
rush to deploy an operational carrier. The most that a major purchase of new
aircraft, such as the Russian two-seat Su-30MKK, or the Chinese version, the
MK2, can offer the PLANAF is greater ability to perform its basic missions.
Better weapons and more experience with air-to-surface attack can extend
area-denial and interdiction incrementally, but significant growth of that envelope is unlikely without sea-based aviation and land-based, over-water, midair
refueling capability, in addition to some means of coordination and defense
(e.g., an AWACS* equivalent). Both of these capabilities appear to be high priorities for the PLAN. China purchased Russian A-50 AWACS-type aircraft in 2000,
following cancellation of Israel’s Phalcon sale amid mounting American pressure. China is also reportedly developing the KJ-2000, and indigenous
50
AWACS-type aircraft. “While the larger, more advanced” KJ-2000 is envisioned to conduct “long-range, comprehensive aerial patrolling and control
roles,” the smaller KJ-200/Y-8 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft (nicknamed “Balance Beam” in the West), with an electronically steered phased array,
offers “a less expensive platform for tactical airborne early warning and elec51
tronic intelligence missions.” Various sources report that a KJ-200 aircraft
crashed on 4 June 2006, killing forty people and possibly setting back the pro52
gram. China is also reportedly considering Russia’s Kamov Ka-31 helicopter
53
for carrier-based AEW. China still relies on Russian aerial refueling tankers
(for instance, the Il-78) but is struggling to achieve domestic production capabilities even there.
If the experience of other navies is any measure, the Chinese also need to realize that getting carrier operations right will involve the loss of expensive aircraft
and hard-to-replace pilots. In 1954 alone, in working to master jet aviation off
carriers, the U.S. Navy lost nearly eight hundred aircraft. In 1999 the Navy lost
only twenty-two, but these were the most advanced aircraft flown by the world’s
* The U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System, carried by the E-3A aircraft.
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most experienced aviators. While the Chinese will certainly benefit from improvements in technology and will not be attempting a scale of operations even
close to that of the United States during the early Cold War, they must realize
that their learning curve will be costly in terms of blood and treasure. Moreover,
the PLAN air force has traditionally been poorly funded and its pilots have only a
fraction of the flying hours that their peers in the United States, India, and Japan
have. These factors will make China’s mastery of carrier aviation even more
costly in human terms.
Quantum leaps forward are required not only in sea-based fixed-wing aviation and midair refueling but also in PLAN doctrine and antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) as well as in PLANAF service culture if China’s aerial power-projection
capabilities are to be improved dramatically. Without major improvements in
ASW, for instance, any Chinese CV would be an easy target for a diesel-electric
or nuclear-powered attack submarine (SS/SSN). Chinese ASW capabilities,
while slowly improving, cannot yet
be counted on to provide a reasonable degree of security in open waters. In a crisis scenario, many air
support tasks would be performed
by the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF). This means that, unlike a U.S. carrier strike group, a Chinese CSG would not need to be
wholly self-supporting. But it remains unclear how capable of joint
coordination China’s different services are in operations over water.
View from the flight deck of the Kiev. There are no actual carrier aircraft present at this
Integrating operations between a
museum.
highly regimented and rigidly structured PLAAF and an immature and sea-based PLAN contingent would require
technological and service-culture innovations, as well as exercises less carefully
scripted than has been usual, to develop the requisite interoperability and
interservice coordination. Significant additional research is required to gauge
how much coordination exists within the PLAN between its ground-based naval
air and surface/subsurface assets. This is all the more critical as the type and degree of coordination will necessarily vary depending on maritime mission, (i.e.,
humanitarian, interdiction, area denial, sea control, or strike power projection).
The Chinese navy must also determine what mix of surface vessels and submarines would be necessary to support a carrier. Here the evolution of the overall naval order of battle may offer insights. China might be unlikely to commit
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itself to a militarily useful carrier until it could fill out the strike group without
compromising its ability to fulfill other missions. Analysis here requires
nuanced understanding of exactly what it takes to operate a carrier and what
mixes of indigenous products and off-the-shelf technologies could be combined
in a Chinese strike group. CVs are highly vulnerable even with supporting strike
groups, especially from submarines of the United States and other regional competitors; the time and expense of deploying a carrier will be for naught if it cannot be protected.
As they currently stand, China’s capabilities are sufficient to give the United
States pause if a Taiwan conflict scenario were to erupt, but truly controlling the
battle space against a determined and capable adversary remains a Chinese aspiration, not a demonstrated capability.
THE ROLE OF A CARRIER IN CHINESE NAVAL DOCTRINE
If China were to achieve any of the acquisition options outlined above and outfit
a carrier, such a ship, while expensive and complicated, would indeed be a useful
asset. It would have little role in a near-term Taiwan scenario, however, as landbased PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft could probably handle all of the required air
operations across the narrow Taiwan Strait. Unless China is able to produce and
incorporate a range of carriers in a cohesive and effective concept of operations,
it is difficult to envision carriers as the centerpiece of Chinese naval doctrine in
future decades. In his memoirs, Adm. Liu Huaqing described aircraft carriers as
providing air coverage essential to offshore defense. An aircraft carrier would
thus facilitate Chinese air operations in the Taiwan Strait by obviating the need
for short-range fighters to sortie from land bases. This, Liu believed, would max55
imize the utility of China’s existing aircraft. However, Liu made these statements in 1987, before modern precision weaponry. Indeed, a concomitant shift
in operational scenarios may at least partially explain apparent indecision in
China concerning aircraft carrier development. Though periodically considered, it may have been repeatedly postponed in favor of submarines. Even Liu
acknowledged that nuclear submarines are “one of the very most important
56
pieces of naval equipment.” A senior Chinese official has further emphasized to
the authors that “China will not try to compete with the U.S. in the open sea.
57
Even twenty PRC carriers cannot compete with U.S. nuclear carriers.”
That said, there are two general categories of potential carrier roles in the
PLAN. The first is as a discrete capability to support secondary missions. The
second is as a complement to China’s submarine-centered fleet. As to using carriers as a discrete platform, the most basic motivation is prestige—particularly
for a great power still seeking to right the wrongs of its devastating national
weakness since 1840. As one Chinese analysis emphasizes,
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The enterprise of China’s ocean development has a splendid history dating back to
[Ming Dynasty Admiral] Zheng He’s seven voyages to the West. But its previous feudal rulers locked their doors against the world. They fettered the Chinese Nation’s
vigorous ocean-based development. This included especially the Ming and Qing [dynasties’] severe prohibition of maritime [focus] for over 400 years. This repeatedly
caused the Chinese Nation to miss favorable opportunities [that would have stemmed
from] developing civilization from the sea. Then the Western gunships bombarded
their way through the gate that China’s feudal rulers had locked. Thenceforth, a succession of wars of invasion from the sea visited profound suffering as well as galling
shame and humiliation on the Chinese Nation. The beautiful, abundant ocean gave
58
forth only sorrow and tears.

Chinese interlocutors often tell Westerners that “a nation cannot become a great
power without having an aircraft carrier.” Lt. Gen. Wang Zhiyuan, deputy director
of the PLA General Armament Department’s Science and Technology Commission,
stated in a 2006 interview that the PLA “will conduct research and build aircraft carriers on its own, and develop its own carrier fleet. Aircraft carriers are a very important tool available to major powers when they want to protect their maritime rights
and interests. As China is such a large country with such a long coastline and we
want to protect our maritime interests, aircraft carriers are an absolute neces59
sity.” Zhang’s conception of China as facing both challenges and opportunities
60
from the sea is prevalent among Chinese analysts.
Carrier acquisition can also be seen as part of regional power competition.
When the Japanese deploy their larger version of the Osumi-class LST, or when
the Indian navy puts a refurbished Gorshkov to sea, the Chinese may be compelled to accelerate their carrier program to maintain the appearance of a great
power. But this is more than simply an issue of face. Showing the flag is important, but as Japan itself maintains, some form of carrier is needed for peacekeeping operations, as well as for humanitarian intervention and for defense of
vital and lengthy sea lines of communication.
This unique role for aircraft carriers was demonstrated by the 2004 tsunami,
after which the PLAN found itself on the outside looking in, especially compared to the U.S. Navy, but more painfully to the Indian navy and, even more unbearably, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).61 An article in the
PLAN publication Dangdai Haijun (Modern Navy) assessed that Japan’s “first
dispatch of a warship overseas [for] search and rescue . . . demonstrated its status
as a ‘great power of disaster relief.’” The article noted that the U.S. “dispatched
[the Abraham Lincoln] carrier battle group to the rescue” and that India’s “navy
served as the daring vanguard.” It concludes, “The rescue activities following the
Indian Ocean tsunami abundantly illustrated that the use of armed forces is not
only to prevent conflict or to wage wars, but also brings into play the key actions
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of national construction, disaster relief, and rebuilding.” Aircraft carriers and
62
helicopters, it suggests, are vital for such “non-combat military operations.”
The final category of potential Chinese carrier missions includes collective
maritime security (e.g., sea-lane protection and counterpiracy). This collectivesecurity force structure is obviously a secondary mission of the PLAN, and it
would be oriented toward friends and rivals in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Deployment of an aircraft carrier would enable modest force projection to assert Chinese claims in the South China Sea. In this vision, Varyag or
an indigenous carrier in the mold of India’s older Viraat, its new Gorshkov, Thailand’s Chakri Naruebet, or Japan’s Osumi would be all the Chinese would need.
A more robust and capable carrier strike group might be needed properly to defend Chinese sea lanes and energy access through the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean, but even an ability to show the flag in this fashion could have
valuable psychological effects. In an important article in 1998, noted China Institute of Contemporary International Relations scholar Zhang Wenmu contended that America had historically pursued a strategy of monopolizing access
to oil. Land-accessible energy resources in Central Asia offer an important hedge
against Chinese reliance on sea-based energy supply, which is far easier for U.S.
63
forces to control and disrupt. But Zhang strongly believed that China must
control its sea-based oil supplies as well:
China is facing fierce competition overseas in obtaining its share of crude oil. . . .
[U]nder globalization a nation’s energy security is no longer an economic issue
alone. Instead, it is also a political issue, as well as a military issue. . . . [It is therefore
necessary to] build up our navy as quickly as possible. . . . We must be prepared as
early as possible. Otherwise, China may lose everything it has gathered in normal in64
ternational economic activities, including its energy interest, in a military defeat.
China should strive to develop its naval power. China should not only strengthen its
naval power and defense to protect imported oil, but also expand its navy to achieve
its influence over the offshore resources in the Asia Pacific region with [its] complex
rights dispute[s]. [Sea] power has a permanent [significance for] the trade of coastal
countries, and the backup of a country’s [sea] power is its navy. Therefore, the long
term approach toward ensuring open sea lane and potential ocean resources is to
[develop] a modern oceangoing navy.65

For these reasons and others, Zhang strongly contended, China needs aircraft
carriers—although nuclear submarines are even more important (at least at
66
present).
As to the issues of complementary capabilities in Chinese submarine doctrine, the Soviet model might be illustrative. Soviet deck aviation had an important ASW component. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet navy considered
bastion strategies of protecting SSBNs, performing area-denial and ASW
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centered on helicopter carriers like Minsk and Moskva. The original approach
was later supplemented by the Kuznetzov/Varyag, designed for force-on-force
67
operations. There is some evidence that China might follow this pattern of integrated air and undersea warfare doctrine, but like all carrier discussions, this is
still very hypothetical.
In the near term, if China cannot solve the extended-deployment issue and its
SSBNs have to stay close to home, there might be logic in the carriers’ protecting
an SSBN bastion in the Yellow Sea, Bohai Gulf, or South China Sea. But pursuit
of such a strategy was arguably problematic for the Soviet Union. A bastion
strategy might be even more counterproductive for China; forces devoted to
supporting and defending a carrier are better spent elsewhere if fixed-wing ASW
assets cannot be developed and deployed either from land bases or onboard ship.
Even then, force protection, as it is in the U.S. Navy, would be a major drain. In an
era in which long-distance precision strike has been emphasized—particularly
by the U.S. military—it is far from clear how survivable Chinese aircraft carriers
might be, particularly in a concentrated bastion, where they would offer dense
targeting options for a wide variety of adversary platforms, although targeting
the right vessel would still be a complex problem for the adversary.
A SMALLER HELICOPTER CARRIER: CHINA’S INTERIM
COMPROMISE?
China already has some experience with a ship that can support multiple helicopters, albeit an extremely modest one. The multirole aviation training ship
0891A Shichang has a large aft helicopter deck, accounting for two-thirds of its
125-meter (410-foot) length. The deck has dual landing spots for Harbin Zhi-9A
helicopters. Removing equipment containers (designed for rapid reconfiguration) aft could make space for a total of three helicopters. Shichang was conceived as both “China’s first aerial service capacity ship” and “first national
defense mobilization warship” as part of a larger plan to refit merchant vessels
68
rapidly for defense mobilization. This initiative apparently began in 1989, and
was motivated in part by British and American use of commercial vessels in the
69
Falklands War and later by Operation DESERT STORM, respectively. Shichang is
entirely indigenous in its development and production, and reportedly meets all
70
relevant domestic and international standards.
Shichang, which resembles the Royal Navy’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary aviation
training and primary casualty reception ship Argus, was launched on 28 December 1996 in Shanghai; it was dispatched to the Dalian Naval Academy in 1997
following rigorous sea trials, prioritized by the PLAN leadership, ranging as far
71
away as the South China Sea. According to an article that originally appeared in
China’s PLA Daily, Shichang, together with the naval cadet training ship Zheng
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He, serves as an “at sea university,” one that has trained two of every three cur72
rent PLAN officers. Shichang’s 9,500-ton displacement, 17.5-knot speed,
crew of two hundred, and range of eight thousand nautical miles suggest a se73
rious effort to develop some limited form of deck aviation. It is at sea two
hundred days per year, and its crew is accustomed to handling typhoons and
74
thirty-degree rolls. It supports “simultaneous operations of multiple helicopters,” which “facilitates training for shipboard helicopter operations, as well as
75
amphibious assault training.” Shichang “is widely regarded as the prelude to
construction of a [true] helicopter carrier or amphibious assault vessel [presumably LPD- and LPH-type ships], and provides a basis for perfecting fixedwing aircraft carrier operational concepts.” With its helicopter module, it can
serve as a “transfer station” for “a group of helicopters in wartime.”76 Shichang is
77
also envisioned as having an ASW mission.
A detailed 2005 analysis of China’s prospects for developing a helicopter carrier
states that “arrogant intervention of hostile great power(s) in the cross-Strait divide requires us to prepare for successful military struggle. Moreover, China still
has some significant maritime territorial disputes with some peripheral countries.” Its author believes that a coastal defense strategy is increasingly inadequate
for China’s future needs, which include “energy security, economic development,
and political stability,” all of which “are increasingly intimately connected with the
international situation.” Developing a helicopter carrier is therefore China’s best
78
“springboard” for such a “development strategy.”
Considering funding, technology, and tactical issues, a helicopter carrier’s displacement should be approximately 15,000 tons when fully loaded. It should be able to accommodate approximately 15 helicopters (12 ASW helicopters [and] 4 advance
warning helicopters. . . .) The [hurdle] of 10,000 ton ship technology is small. China
has previously constructed the “Shichang” training ship of around 10,000 tons. . . . As
a result of limited tonnage, the equipment demands of a helicopter carrier are lower
than those of a large or medium aircraft carrier, [helicopter carriers] can use [the]
Commercial Off the Shelf Technologies (COTS) method in their construction, and
[their] costs can be greatly reduced.79

Further, “China’s opportunity, funding and technology for developing a helicopter carrier are all mature. Because the superpowers have encircled China’s
periphery, and the opportunity for developing a fixed-wing aircraft carrier is not
mature, the author believes that firmly grasping the opportunity to develop a
helicopter carrier is the correct choice. China’s Navy should reasonably call [the
80
carrier] its own ‘Moskva’ class. I hope this day arrives soon!” Among the models reportedly under consideration is a fifteen-to-twenty-thousand-ton
LHD-like amphibious assault ship, featuring a large deck that can handle heavy
81
transport helicopters and a mix of amphibious landing craft.
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The wide range of challenges inherent in developing a successful large-scale
carrier and questions concerning its mission utility suggest that China may take
a creative approach to carrier development, as it has done in other areas. Here it
may be useful to examine other platform developments to seek patterns that
would reveal PLA decision-making patterns and practices.
One notable trend in PLAN development has been the production
of single, or short-series, platforms.
Examples include emulation of Soviet efforts to build a dedicated
minelaying vessel.82 China’s initial
Xia SSBN is another potential example. Some Western analysts might ascribe such activity to mere copying
of Soviet failures or to a PLAN experiencing growing pains that reduced
its ability to plan for and produce an
effective fleet. But another interpreThe Kiev museum at Tianjin contains photographs of other nations’ aircraft carriers, perhaps
tation, one that is supported by some
implying that aircraft carriers are a natural part of all great-power navies.
Chinese sources, is that such smallscale experimentation deliberately facilitates learning independent of immediate combat relevance. Viewed in this light, the Chinese navy might attempt to
retrofit Varyag to begin experimentation with naval aviation—perhaps with lit83
tle or no intention of ever using the resulting platform in battle.
Such a vessel might also be used to practice operations against foreign carriers. Chinese specialists are acutely aware of aircraft carrier vulnerabilities, having conducted a wide variety of research apparently directed toward threatening
aircraft carriers with ballistic and cruise missiles, submarine-launched torpe84
does, and sea mines. One Chinese article emphasizes these “trump cards” as
85
well as “neutron bombs [and] stealth missile ships.” China’s rapidly developing
navy might view a carrier-based force posture as entirely premature yet also see
the need to begin preparing for a future in which China’s maritime interests are
more wide ranging and its capability to defend those interests greatly advanced.
By that time, improvements in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision weaponry might conceivably have rendered aircraft carriers and other surface vessels ineffective for some missions—the “floating coffins” that Nikita
Khrushchev foresaw.86 But by cultivating a nascent capability, however modest,
the PLAN would have hedged its bets.
A second trend has been to improvise and compromise. A case can be made
that the PLAN has long recognized its limitations in capability and lived within
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them. Some Western analysts appear to engage in “mirror imaging” in assuming
that China will automatically emulate American and Soviet large-deck aviation
trajectories. But even a serious Chinese carrier development program might
look substantially different from that of the superpowers. In August 1986, Liu
Huaqing recalled, “when I was briefed by the leaders of the Naval Armament and
Technology Department and the Feasibility Study Center, I assigned them a task
regarding the development of carriers. I said, ‘The method of building an aircraft carrier is a matter of overall naval construction. Whether [we are to build]
helicopter carrier(s) and escort carriers in different stages, or [to] directly build
87
escort carriers [is a matter that we] must assess carefully.’” Recently, the Chinese have been surprisingly open minded as to the definition of a “carrier,” running as it does the gamut from amphibious warfare ships through helicopter and
88
hybrid carriers, up to the U.S. supercarriers. A senior Chinese official stated to
the authors that “China will not develop Nimitz-class carriers but rather
89
mid-sized carriers.” In this regard, France may be a model for China. According to one article, “Since the 1970s, China has dispatched a large number of military personnel to each of the French Navy’s research institutes for exchange.
[They] have conducted thorough analysis on aircraft-carrier-related technology. Many people follow France’s aircraft carriers carefully, even learning from
90
personal experience how to pilot carrier-based aircraft for deck landings.”
Numerous literature and analyses concerning Western helicopter “carriers”
91
suggest that this might be a more logical arc for the PLAN. These smaller, simpler carriers would be substantially easier to build and operate. Helicopter carriers might also better serve Chinese operational requirements, ranging from
augmenting China’s currently anemic airborne ASW capability to logistical sup92
port and even humanitarian missions.
The major obstacle to successful Chinese development of helicopter carriers is
the continuing backwardness of its rotary-wing aircraft development and inventory. The entire People’s Liberation Army today possesses fewer than 350 helicopters (roughly three hundred in the PLA and forty in the PLAN). Most platforms in
the PLA’s disproportionately small fleet are either imports (for instance, Super
Frelons) or copies of foreign models (like the Z-8 Super Frelon derivative). The
only remotely capable versions are based on French platforms, such as the Dau93
phin (Z-9). China also operates some Russian imports, such as the Ka-28 Helix.
It is finally beginning to address this lack by entering into joint ventures with
Eurocopter to produce more capable machines and to obtain related technology
and expertise. Reportedly, China is developing its first indigenous assault helicop94
ter, the WZ-10 attack variant. For the foreseeable future, however, China may prefer to purchase European helicopters. One Chinese analyst expresses particular
interest in acquiring the Anglo-Italian EH101 and the multirole NATO NH-90
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helicopter, developed by a joint venture of Italian, French, German, Dutch, and Por95
tuguese corporations. This prospect would be greatly strengthened if Europe’s
post-Tiananmen arms embargo were to be further weakened or lifted in the near future. In any case, the state of China’s rotary-wing capability and inventory will likely
serve as a leading indicator of any substantial helicopter carrier initiatives.
The long PRC record of avowedly defensive military development, recently
strained by China’s rising comprehensive national power and Japanese nationalism, suggests that Beijing would carefully weigh the costs and benefits of deploy96
ing so explicit a concept of force projection as a large-deck aircraft carrier.
Other methods and platforms might accomplish many of the same ends without
alienating neighboring countries. Submarines are less conspicuous than many
other major naval platforms. Diesel submarines may be interpreted as defensive
97
in nature. Sea mines, better still, are often invisible even to foreign militaries.
Perhaps that is one reason—aside from survivability and cost-effectiveness—
why China has recently placed so much emphasis on these platforms. Aircraft
carriers, by contrast, are impossible to hide; even to some Chinese leaders they
connote gunboat diplomacy and imperialism, particularly in an East Asia still
98
consumed by memories of Japan’s bloody attempts to rule it. In fact, it is for
precisely these reasons that the Japanese refer to the Osumi as an LST. The Japanese public could also become alarmed by Chinese carrier development and be
stimulated to support constitutional revision, increased military spending, and
even nuclear weapons development. Any form of an arms race with so capable
and strategically situated a nation as Japan is clearly something that China
would prefer to avoid. These are not reasons why China would never develop aircraft carriers, but they do suggest that China will do so only cautiously and with
full cognizance of opportunity and contingency costs.
No doubt these issues have engendered substantial debate within China’s civilian and military leadership, debate reflected at least in part by the diverse opinions
of Chinese analysts in open sources. Perhaps some of the rumors and activities
that make the question of Chinese aircraft carrier development so fascinating can
be ascribed to just such a process. If and when China does embark on an unmistakable course of acquisition, we can expect to see sophisticated attempts to explain why China’s carriers are different from, and serve different purposes than,
their Japanese, Soviet, and American predecessors or their Indian, Japanese, Thai,
American, and European contemporaries. Whatever carrier China does manage
to deploy will likely be framed within peaceful rhetoric. “Our purpose in manufacturing aircraft carrier(s) is not to compete with the United States or the [former] Soviet Union, but rather to meet the demands of the struggle [to recover]
Taiwan, to solve the Spratly Islands disputes and to safeguard [China’s] maritime
rights and interests,” Liu Huaqing emphasized in his memoirs. “In peace time,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006
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[aircraft carriers] could be used to maintain world peace, thereby expanding our
99
international political influence.” Like other aspects of Chinese maritime development, it will likely be imbued with shades of the Zheng He metaphor, “peaceful” voyages of discovery and goodwill commanded by the fifteenth-century
100
eunuch admiral. A recent series in China’s official navy newspaper to commemorate the six hundredth anniversary of Zheng He’s voyages emphasized precisely
101
these factors. In fact, Chinese commentators make the case that while China has
historically been able to build great ships, it has never used them to dictate terms
102
to others. For instance, the senior Chinese official we interviewed in mid-2006
emphasized that “a Chinese aircraft
carrier would not be used to seek
103
hegemony.” While the merits of
such claims are open to debate, they
do hint at one way in which naval
power is conceptualized in the contemporary PRC. In a more immediate sense, U.S., Japanese, Indian, and
Thai operations in the aftermath of
the 2004 tsunami have convinced
many Chinese that good carriers
make good neighbors and that they
are a necessity if China’s force strucThe Kiev museum includes a display describing the carrier’s distinctively large towed sonar
ture available for deployment to
body. This illustrates how Soviet carrier design developed very differently from its Western
counterparts, raising the fundamental question of how such design elements have influenced
Southeast Asia is to match and comChinese thinking with respect to deck aviation platforms.
104
plement its diplomatic initiatives.
In May 1998, for instance, Shichang visited Sydney, Australia, with the de105
stroyer Qingdao and the hospital ship Nancang. This was part of a larger mission of Shichang and fellow training ship Zheng He—to “reveal the graceful
bearing of a new generation of PLAN officers, spread the arena of friendship,
understand the world, open the window of a [new] a field of vision, increase
experience, [and become] a study platform” by visiting over sixty sea areas and
106
ports, including Hawaii and Vladivostok. Shichang has also visited New Zea107
land and the Philippines. It is designed specifically to deploy to “disaster
areas.” Under Captain Wang Gexin, its hospital unit has also participated in
108
domestic flood relief efforts. Shichang conducted a “national defense mobilization drill” near Xiamen on 28 July 1999.109 Shichang has proved capable of
long-distance open-ocean navigation. In July–August 1999 “it carr[ied] out
110
at-sea defense drills, [the] largest, furthest, and longest in PLAN history.”
Perhaps Shichang was not deployed to help with tsunami relief in 2004 because
it is indispensable to PLAN training. If that is the case, maybe China would
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/4
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consider such a role in the future if its helicopter carriers become more sophisticated and numerous.
The logic Chinese sources outline for the utility of a small carrier for regional
purposes raises the interesting ideas of both a naval “ecosystem” and a modern,
regional basis for capital-ship calculations. Chinese calculations of a small carrier’s utility in regional diplomacy vis-à-vis the Indian navy and the JMSDF are
very similar to the logic that Alfred Thayer Mahan used when calculating how
many battleships should be posted on America’s West Coast vis-à-vis the Royal
Navy, French, and German navies to prevent adventurism on the west coast of
South America. In a Chinese context, the idea might be to complicate the calculations of others with claims to the Spratlys or other contested areas. The tactical
utility of these platforms as disaster relief sea bases offers a positive spin-off for
diplomacy. The idea of a regional naval ecosystem is of great potential importance to the development of a global maritime security network, as the U.S. Navy
goes about rendering naval security assistance. All U.S. actions will have second
and third order effects on these systems. Awareness of such ramifications will be
111
essential for the conduct of effective Phase Zero (precursor) operations.
A NEW GOLD STANDARD
In their excellent article in the Winter 2004 issue of this journal, You Ji and Ian
Storey concluded that
with the retirement of Liu in 1997. . . the aircraft carrier lost its champion in the
Chinese navy. At the same time, the need to control the South China Sea as a strategic
priority was downgraded as reunification with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing’s
agenda. In that context, given the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in
the capabilities of the Chinese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not
now considered vital.112

This and similar U.S. Defense Department assessments of recent years that
China’s carrier program was sidelined were correct and would likely be confirmed by senior Chinese officials at the time. Following the 2004 tsunami and
especially with the advent of the eleventh five-year plan, however, those priorities seem to be changing. What even a modest carrier can do in the near term
caught the Chinese by surprise in early 2005, when they watched in horror as Indian and Japanese carriers conducted post-tsunami relief operations. Thus, in
reconceptualizing the PLAN carrier, China’s two potential role models—and
competitors—are not the United States and the former Soviet Union but rather
India and Japan. Fixating on the global “gold standard” for aircraft carriers is no
longer the only, or even the most appealing, option for China. Beijing’s strategic
focus on Taiwan militates against developing aircraft carriers, except for small
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helicopter carriers serving as antisubmarine-warfare platforms, for that specific
scenario. To China’s south and southwest, however, especially along the lengthy
sea lines of communication, aircraft carriers of all variations could play more
useful operational and diplomatic roles. A carrier as a discrete capability fulfilling secondary roles, such as sea-lane security and humanitarian and disaster relief missions, is therefore the most likely trajectory.
Nevertheless, once China has multiple carriers in operation, there is no reason to think that new technologies and doctrines will preclude Beijing from
linking the carrier to its more capable and far more numerous submarines. As
many as twelve to fifteen helicopter carriers or a mix of modest carriers and
somewhat larger variants would represent a significant shift in ASW capability
and may better complement the submarine-centered navy, which China is
clearly developing at present, than would large-deck fixed-wing alternatives.
With the wealth of new models of carriers and operational concepts available to
watch, the carrier discussion in China—while still theoretical—has matured.
On paper at least, the Chinese have avoided the pitfall of spending too much on
the wrong platforms at the wrong time. It remains to be seen, however, exactly
what place aircraft carrier development will have in what has been a prolonged,
publicized, and increasingly successful attempt by China to become a maritime
power.
One thing is clear: Beijing will continually search for the most effective platforms with which to assert control over its maritime periphery. As a recent article in the PLA Daily emphasizes,
We must absolutely no longer be the least bit neglectful regarding the “world without
markers” of our vast sea area, our blue frontier. We must no longer customarily assert that the total area of our national territory is 9.6 million square kilometers. To
that we must add our sea area of 3 million square kilometers, our blue frontier. Who
will protect this vast blue frontier? How should it be protected? Those are questions
which every Chinese person, and especially every member of the Chinese armed
forces, must ponder carefully. During China’s era of weakness and degeneration in
the past, in the face of power backed up by gunboats, we lost many things which we
should not have lost. It’s a different era now. We must not lose anything. We must
fight for every inch of territory, and never give up an inch of sea area! We must build
a powerful Navy, and protect our coastal defenses, our islands, our vast blue frontier,
and everything within the scope of our maritime rights and interests. Cherishing and
protecting the seas and oceans is the sacred duty and responsibility of our republic’s
military personnel. Every intangible “boundary marker” and “sentry post” at sea
113
must always be clearly visible in the minds of every one of us.
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